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This report provides a “snapshot” of the state of transparency with regard to agribusiness and other land-based investment in Cameroon. For the purposes of this
report, we define “land investment transparency” as being based on the human
rights to information and to participate in public decision-making; it therefore includes public disclosure of relevant land investment-related information, as well
as access to, comprehension of, and use of that information by project-affected
communities and the government, among other actors, to influence decisions
concerning investment and to hold powerful actors to their obligations, among
other legitimate objectives.
Despite some governmental participation in initiatives that publish investment-related information,1 land investment governance in Cameroon cannot be
said to operate in a meaningfully transparent manner. Cameroon’s legal and policy framework concerning land governance and investment is out of date and not
fit for purpose.2 Cameroon’s government (hereinafter, “the Government”) may
think it can use its role as guardian of National Land to strengthen its control over
lands and resources; but a top-down approach to concession allocation and a reluctance to recognize all legitimate tenure rights will threaten the Government’s
legitimacy as the grievances of citizens and investors alike continue to grow and
lead to the barring of roads by communities and investor withdrawals. Community members interviewed were frustrated with being excluded from decisions
concerning their lands and resources and unable to easily access, understand,
and use relevant information to influence such decisions.3 These sentiments
were echoed by many within the Government, with one representative decrying, for instance, that investment project approvals “are decided on in Yaoundé
before even speaking to community members.”4 The private sector also regards
Cameroon’s laws as needing reform. The operator of one of the three sites we
visited told us that its development “will not continue” due to “difficulties encountered in the land allocation process.”5 Another company told us that “the
current legal framework related to land tenure needs to be adapted to better
correspond to today’s life and the aspirations of communities, private companies
and the State.”6 Cameroon is accordingly perceived internationally as a location
that is “growing more difficult” for private sector investment.7 Land investment
transparency in Cameroon appears to have inadequately advanced since 2013
when a report on a similar topic made similar findings.8
1 See “Snapshot of Cameroon’s Transparency and Governance Landscape,” below.
2 See “Cameroon’s Legal Framework,” below.
3 See “Community Experiences,” below.
4
Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019. This was echoed by other
Government representatives, see note 80, below.
5 Email to CCSI, Sep. 15, 2020.
6 Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
7 See “Snapshot of Cameroon’s Transparency and Governance Landscape,” and below note
35.
8 Centre pour l’environnement et le développement (CED), La transparence dans le secteur
foncier au Cameroun: Etude de cas préliminaire de la cohabitation entre agro-industries et
communautés locales et autochtones. (2013), https://bit.ly/3jQRhOH.
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Recommendations for Inclusion in a New Land Law

Our findings reveal worrying dynamics concerning both
the substance of Cameroon’s legal standards and the
Government’s implementation of those standards. The
apparent impasse regarding land governance reform risks
further damaging Cameroon’s investment environment,
limiting the Government’s ability to facilitate appropriate
and responsible investment.9 We recommend that a new
law concerning the governance of land and land-based
investment be developed in close consultation and collaboration with citizens, Indigenous groups, civil society, other stakeholders, and experts. A reformed, human
rights-compliant law that recognizes legitimate tenure
rights should be paired with a renewed governmental
commitment—and concrete strategies—to monitor and
regulate investment, and implement and enforce applicable legal frameworks. These recommended elements
can help enable Cameroon’s people to pursue sustainable
development, create increased certainty for investors, and
encourage more informed and coordinated governmental
decision-making that can provide for present and future
prosperity and responsible environmental stewardship.
Given the grave transparency challenges—for communities, citizens, the Government, and investors, among
others—highlighted in this report, it would introduce an
unacceptable amount of risk of social conflict if the Government were to approve any additional large-scale landbased investment projects under the current legal framework. We therefore recommend that the Government temporarily cease making any new approvals for large-scale
agribusiness and other land-based investment projects
until the legal and policy landscape in Cameroon has been
reformed in line with the following recommendations.
9

See text accompanying notes 31 and 35, below.

In order for a new law to adequately address transparency and meaningful community participation in decision-making regarding the governance of land and landbased investment, we recommend it include the following
features.
1. Information needs of affected communities. The Government and investor companies should provide all
communities, and all community members—including women, youth, Indigenous people, and people
with disabilities, among others—whose lands, resources, or human rights were, are, or stand to be affected by a land or resource investment project with
information about the project that is:
o
o

o

o
o

Pertinent, including how the project and its operations will affect them, both positively and negatively;
Empowering, including information about community members’ rights, the actual or likely rights
and obligations of the company and the Government, and the avenues through which communities may participate in and influence decision-making about the project;
In a form that is understandable and provides an
appropriate level of detail, enabling communities
to make informed decisions without being overwhelmed by too much detail or overly complex or
technical language;
Delivered via accessible processes and formats
including meetings, images and video, document
summaries, and site visits, among others;
Delivered in a timely manner, including before
any authorizations are granted and before decisions are made throughout the life of the investment;
3
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o
o
o

Shared continuously;
Delivered and shared in the language(s) most
commonly spoken by each community group;
and
Provided to community members as a right with
the objective of fostering community members’
understanding and empowerment.

2. Information needs of the Government and the public.
To improve the performance of, and coordination between, all relevant Government entities and offices,10
the Government should publicly disclose, and, where
relevant, require other information holders to publicly
disclose:
o

o

o

o

o

All information concerning the rights and obligations of companies, the Government, and other
actors relating to all past, current, and future land
or resource investment projects, and information
about the actual people who directly or indirectly
own, control, or benefit from the companies (often
called the “beneficial owners”);
Documents including, among others, investor-state contracts and all letters and instruments amending such contracts (in line with the
2018 Transparency Code), community-investor
contracts, decrees, permits, authorizations, and
maps;
Such information in a consolidated form at a
centralized location, and/or through forms of
communication like online databases (such as the
Cameroon Forest Atlas), that are publicly available and reasonably accessible;
Such information in a timely manner, and as
soon as practicable after such instruments and
information are executed or otherwise created or
updated; and
Such information in a manner that, consistent
with the constitutional freedom to receive and
impart information,11 is reasonably accessible by
citizens, civil society organizations, and the media, among others.

10 This includes all public entities who facilitate, adapt legal
frameworks for, monitor, regulate, and develop development plans in
the context of, land and resource investments, including at the national,
regional (régional), departmental (départemental et préfectural), and
district (arrondissement et sous-prefecture) levels.
11 Constitution of Cameroon, Law No. 96/06 of 18 January 1996 to
amend the Constitution of 2 June 1972, Art. 19.
4

3. Community needs, in order to understand and use
information. To fulfill the human rights of all community members—and not only their formal leaders—to
be informed and to meaningfully participate in decision-making concerning their rights, lands, and resources, the Government should facilitate and establish, and/or cause others to facilitate and establish:
o
o

o

o

Programs and processes to empower all community members to know and uphold their, and other actors’, rights and responsibilities;
Processes that allow for all community members
to use all relevant information to further their understandings, deliberate internally, and influence
decision-making, such as timely consultations,
impact assessment, pre-authorization and iterative consent processes; and community-led or
participatory monitoring efforts. Such processes
should also provide for “a transparent and participatory debate on the opportunity costs of granting land to investors that plan to develop agro-industrial plantations, when strengthening small local farmers’ access to land, by means of adequate
State support, could do more to improve local
food security and reduce rural poverty;”12
Multi-stakeholder dialogue processes that: include representatives from communities other
than chiefs, such as representatives of Indigenous
communities, women, youth, and other less dominant groups; follow robust governance practices
to minimize the ability of powerful actors to dominate and coopt the process; have clear objectives;
are sustainably financed; and are facilitated by
trusted and independent actors who are familiar
with the local context, experienced in facilitating multi-stakeholder dialogue, and sensitized
on the human rights of community members to
informedly participate in and influence decision-making; and
Grievance redress, dispute resolution, and formal justice processes that, consistent with the
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human

12 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De
Schutter, Addendum: Mission to Cameroon. (Dec. 18, 2012), UN Doc.
A/HRC/22/50/Add.2, paras. 48, 73(i). See also Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, “Voluntary Guidelines on the
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the
Context of National Food Security (VGGT),” Report of the 38th (Special)
Session of the Committee on World Food Security. (May 11, 2012), Art.
12.6, https://bit.ly/2ZqvdCD, which states that “States should consider
promoting a range of production and investment models that do not
result in the large-scale transfer of tenure rights to investors, and should
encourage partnerships with local tenure right holders.”
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Rights, are legitimate, accessible, predictable, equitable, transparent, rights-compatible, a source
of continuous learning, and designed in close consultation with the community members for whose
use they are intended.13
4. Funding for technical support to communities. Enabling all community members to access, understand,
generate, and use relevant information to meaningfully participate in decision-making and pursue other
legitimate objectives will often require legal empowerment, independent technical support, and other
resources, all of which may increase demands for
funding. The Government should make, and require
companies to make, adequate financial contributions
to trusted, independent initiatives that finance such
community support without introducing the risk of
such payments creating a lever of undue influence
over communities.14
5. Indigenous communities. In line with its obligations
under international law, the Government should respect, protect, and fulfill Indigenous people’s international human rights. The Government and companies
should:
o

o

o

Take Indigenous people’s rights under international law, and their often precarious and marginalized position within Cameroonian society,
into account when designing and implementing
investment-related decision-making processes;
make sure that such processes are inclusive and
proactively allow for Indigenous people to meaningfully participate; and respect their decisions
to give or withhold their free, prior and informed
consent;
Make sure that Indigenous communities can
meaningfully access the independent financing initiatives described in recommendation 4,
above; and
Arrange for all processes in which communities
participate to take place in, or be simultaneously translated into, relevant local Indigenous languages.

13 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,
UN Doc. HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), Principle 31.
14 Such initiatives may include independently operated basket
funds or other financing initiatives highlighted in Szoke-Burke, S and
Cordes, K, Innovative Financing Solutions for Community Support in the
Context of Land Investments (2019), Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment, https://bit.ly/3eLiKxF.

6. Women and girls. In order to understand and adequately plan for women’s uses of land and natural
resources and mitigate any negative impacts of investment on women, the Government and companies
should take gender-sensitive approaches when implementing investment-related decision-making processes.15 Such approaches should seek to:
o

o

o

Understand and navigate the gender dimensions
of communication with communities, including
gender discrepancies relating to literacy and control of radio and mobile phones;
Take steps to make sure all groups within the community, including women, can access information
and influence relevant decisions. Such steps may
include adjusting meeting times, locations, and
attendees, reserving opportunities for women to
speak and respond to other participants, addressing cultural barriers to obtaining information from
women and existing gender biases in land governance frameworks, more generally; and
Facilitating technical support for women community members specifically.

7. Benefit sharing. In order to enable affected communities to secure promised benefits from investments and
achieve mutually beneficial outcomes for companies,
the Government and/or companies should:
o

o

o

Proactively include communities in the design
of benefit-sharing arrangements, which should be
recorded in legally enforceable contracts to which
the community is a party;
Regularly report to communities on all payments made to central and local government
agencies in a form that that is understandable by
communities; and
Facilitate ongoing opportunities for information
exchange and for communities to influence decisions regarding benefit-sharing arrangements.

8. Recognition of customary land rights. The Government should recognize and protect all legitimate
tenure rights—including undocumented communally-held customary land rights—in line with the Vol15 Such an approach is also consistent with the Government’s
obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) to take measures to eliminate
discrimination, including to address social and cultural patterns of
discriminatory customs and “eliminate discrimination against women
in rural areas [so that they] participate in and benefit from rural
development” (Arts. 5, 14.2).
5
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untary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of
Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests (VGGT), which
were endorsed by Cameroon through its membership
of the Committee on World Food Security.16 Communities as a whole, and not only collectivities of expressly
named individuals, should be able to legally hold such
rights, as should women, even when their occupation
and uses of land are less visible than those of men.
Any legal reforms should be accompanied by plans
and resources to raise awareness about the laws, and
to develop the Government’s skills and strategies for
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement of the
reforms.
9. Recognition of community-generated data. Acknowledging the Government’s previous participation in the
development of methodologies for community-led
land use mapping, the Government should continue
to recognize and support such efforts and be required
to factor community-generated data into its investment approval processes and land use planning more
generally.

16
6

VGGT, above note 12, Art. 3.1.
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Snapshot of Cameroon’s Transparency and Governance Landscape

In the decades following independence in 1960, land and
resource investments in Cameroon were mostly Stateowned. Economic crisis in the mid-1980s eventually led to
the gradual privatization of projects in line with structural
adjustment programs imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions.17 Members of the Government used its monopolistic control over such investments to engage in patronage politics, through which it also sought to build stability
and unity among elite groups and Cameroon’s ethnically
diverse populace.18 The shift to privatization was “often
marked by a lack of transparency and accountability,”19
which reportedly enabled elite actors to secure kickbacks
in exchange for selling public enterprises at a discount.20

17 Konings, P., The Politics of Neoliberal Reforms in Africa: State
and Civil Society in Cameroon. (2011), 74, 84; Assembe-Mvondo, S.
et al., “What happens when corporate ownership shifts to China? A
case study on rubber production in Cameroon,” European Journal
of Development Research 28(3), (2016): 465-478, 470; International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Memorandum and
Recommendation of the President of the IBRD to the Executive Directors
on a Proposed Loan of US$150 Million equivalent to the Republic of
Cameroon for a Structural Adjustment Program. (World Bank, May 16,
1989), https://bit.ly/304iTXL.
18 Konings, P., above note 17, 74-75, 77; Bach, D., “Patrimonialism
and neopatrimonialism: Comparative trajectories and readings,”
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 49(3), (July 2011): 275-294, 276,
citing Médard, J.-F., “L’État sous-développé au Cameroun,” in CEAN,
Année africaine (1977), pp. 35–84 (Paris: Pédone); Bayart, J-F, The State
in Africa: the Politics of the Belly (1993: London: Longman), p. 63.
19 Konings, P., above note 17, 75.
20 Konings, P., above note 17, 85.

The Government continued to use such projects to control
domestic political factions and maintain stability during
the era of privatization; for instance, it preferred to sell enterprises to foreign investors, rather than domestic ones
that could accumulate more power domestically, posing a
threat to the regime’s political control.21 Past reports have
alleged that some senior members of the Government and
the Cameroon Armed Forces, and along with some of their
family members and close associates, hold commercial
interests in natural resource companies the Government is
charged with regulating.22 While some of these allegations
have been denied, others have been met with silence. In
both cases, many people within Cameroon believe this
phenomenon to be real.23 Either scenario is damaging
for Cameroon: if true, such arrangements introduce conflicts of interest and threats to the rule of law that are as
unpalatable for the private sector and donors as they are
for Cameroon’s citizens and human rights activists; if inaccurate and not credibly refuted, such allegations damage
the Government’s legitimacy and Cameroon’s investment
environment.

21 Konings, P., above note 17, 75, 78, 87.
22 See, e.g., Dkamela, G.P., Le contexte de la REDD+ au Cameroun
Causes, agents et institutions. Center for International Forestry Research
(CIFOR), 2011, 18; Pigeaud, F, “Cameroun : Le pillage organisé de l’or
vert,” Alternatives Economiques (Oct. 1, 2004), https://bit.ly/2X13jLx;
Biaga, M, “Cameroun - Politique. Franck Biya, les mille facettes d’un
fils de president,” Cameroun24 (Nov. 26, 2012), https://bit.ly/2CX6D3x;
Fominyen, G, “Corruption is a calamity for Cameroon’s agriculture leading activist,” Thomson Reuters Foundation News (Aug. 9, 2010),
https://tmsnrt.rs/3jKfXse.
23 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
7
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The Government’s approach to land-based investment is
still influenced by its desire for control.24 Despite many of
the country’s laws no longer being fit for purpose,25 there
appears little appetite among the most powerful ranks
of the Government to strengthen community rights and
participation in land governance. Customary land rights
are not legally recognized unless supported by legal documentation, which is virtually unattainable for the majority of Cameroonians,26 and it remains to be seen whether
a national land law reform process will produce a new
legal framework. Population pressure and land speculation in emerging hubs like Kribi are also at boiling point,27
while security challenges and crises have exploded in the
country’s Anglophone territories and violence plagues the
Extreme North region. The Government’s slowness in reforming Cameroon’s land laws is likely a balk at the risk
of changing the status quo.28 The lack of protections for
undocumented customary land rights puts Cameroon far
behind many countries whose laws recognize and protect
customary land rights, including Kenya, Niger and Sierra
Leone, which legally protect undocumented customary
communal land ownership,29 and Burkina Faso, Mali, and
Cote d’Ivoire, which provide different avenues for the registration of communal ownership or possession of lands.30

Investors appear to agree that Cameroon’s laws are not fit
for purpose. Investors aspiring to certification and responsible practices have reportedly left Cameroon because of
profitability and operational challenges, and have been
replaced by less desirable candidates.31 Indeed, the operator of one of the three sites visited told us that despite following Cameroon’s laws its development “will not continue” due to “difficulties encountered in the land allocation
process.”32 That investor further expressed agreement with
“many of the insights and conclusions” in this report.33 Another company told us that “the current legal framework
related to land tenure needs to be adapted to better correspond to today’s life and the aspirations of communities, private companies and the State.”34 This downward
trend is echoed by U.S. State Department assessments of
Cameroon’s business climate as “growing more difficult”
because, among other factors, there are “significant obstacles” to “securing land rights.”35

24 Interviews with Government representative, Nov, 2019; Interviews
and with civil society representatives, Nov, 2019, and Dec, 2019.
25 Nguiffo, S., and Watio, M., Agro-industrial investments in
Cameroon: Large-scale land acquisitions since 2005. (2015), 56.
26 See “Cameroon’s Legal Framework,” below.
27 Tchawa, P., Amélioration de la gouvernance du secteur foncier
au Cameroun: Mise en œuvre du Cadre d’Analyse de la Gouvernance
Foncière. (World Bank, Feb., 2014), 9, 10; Statement from civil society
representative, Nov, 2019.
28 Interview with Government representatives, Nov, 2019; Interview
with civil society representative, Nov, 2019.
29 Kenya : Constitution (2010), Art. 61; Kenya: Land Act 2012, Arts. 2,
5(2); Kenya: Community Land Act 2016, Arts. 2, 5(3); Niger: Loi organique
n° 2004-50 du 22 juillet 2004 fixant l’organisation et la compétence des
juridictions en République du Niger, Art. 5; Niger: Ordonnance n° 93015 du 2 mars 1993, Arts. 5, 9; Sierra Leone: Constitution 1991 (2001),
Arts. 170-71; Sierra Leone: National Land Policy of Sierra Leone (2015),
Chapter 5, 46-47.
30 Burkina Faso (possession foncière rurale): Loi n° 034-2009/AN
portant régime foncier rural, Arts. 6, 34, 44; Mali (possession foncière et
droits fonciers coutumiers): Loi n° 2017-001 du 11 avril 2017 portant sur le
foncier agricole, Arts. 11, 12, 29; Côte d’Ivoire (certificat foncier collectif):
Loi n°98-750 du 23 décembre 1998 relative au domaine foncier rural Modifiée par la loi n°2004-412 du 14 août 2004, Arts. 8-10.

The Government has engaged with transparency efforts
and made relevant commitments in other sectors, but has
not comprehensively implemented these commitments.
It led the way towards transparency of forestry project
documentation with its forest atlas, which publishes information and documents online about forestry concessions, protected areas, community forests, and other activities affecting forests.36 Similarly, Cameroon’s Voluntary

8

Yet, glimmers of hope for land reform and innovation remain. Civil society-led initiatives like LandCam and the
Cameroon National Engagement Strategy (NES) use
multi-stakeholder dialogue to drive discussions and develop ideas for policy reform and improving implementation in the land sector. Civil society organizations are
also paving the way for innovative solutions to land-related challenges, including regional land observatories,
which respond to incoming risks to communities, and
community protocols, which aim to make community decision-making processes more equitable and inclusive of
different groups.

31 Arounsavath, F., “Undercutting Rights: Human rights and
environmental due diligence in the tropical forestry sector: A case study
from Cameroon,” Swedwatch, (2019): 14.
32 Email to CCSI, Sep. 15, 2020.
33 Email to CCSI, Sep. 15, 2020.
34 Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
35 U.S. Department of State, 2019 Investment Climate Statements:
Cameroon. (2019), https://bit.ly/3906Bnd.
36 Ministère des Forêts et de la Faune, World Resources Institute,
Atlas forestier de la République du Cameroun, https://cmr.forest-atlas.
org/map?l=fr. The map includes polygons for agribusiness concessions
although only two actual decrees for those concessions were found on
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Partnership Agreement with the European Union includes
Annex VII,37 which focuses on forest sector transparency
measures and has been incorporated into a draft forestry law. Regrettably, the implementation of Annex VII has
been mixed. Monitors noted previous outages of the Government’s website and documented irregular Government
updates of new information and challenges verifying the
extent to which published information is complete and exhaustive.38 Others reported that Government information
publication measures were actually accompanied by a
decrease in community and multi-stakeholder participation.39 The Government has also engaged with transparency efforts concerning the mining, oil, and gas sectors.
In 2017, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI), a global standard promoting the open and accountable management of oil, gas, and mineral resources, classified Cameroon as having made “meaningful progress” in
implementing the EITI standard. A timeline was therefore
set for Cameroon to meet the EITI’s outstanding requirements. But currently, Cameroon is undergoing its second
validation and risks suspension if all requirements are not
now met.40 Finally, while the Government contributed to
and validated operational guidelines for obtaining free,
prior and informed consent (FPIC) in REDD+ Initiatives,41
implementation of the guidelines is regarded as “an important challenge.”42

the site.
37 Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union
and the Republic of Cameroon on forest law enforcement, governance
and trade in timber and derived products to the European Union
(FLEGT), Oct. 6, 2010, EU Doc. I. 92/4, Annex VII: Published Information,
https://bit.ly/2CykRHw.
38 Forêts et Développement Rural (FODER), Document de travail
N°003 Juillet 2018: Rapport d’évaluation 2018 de la mise en œuvre de
l’annexe vii de L’APV-FLEGT au Cameroun, 5; FERN, Forest Watch Special
FLEGT VPA Update. (Dec. 2018), 2-3.
39 Tegegnea, Y. T. et al., “Synergies among social safeguards in FLEGT
and REDD + in Cameroon,” Forest Policy and Economics 75, (Feb. 2017),
6.
40 EITI Board, Board decision on the validation of Cameroon, Jun.
29, 2018, Decision reference: 2018-32/BM-40, https://bit.ly/38V2OI0;
“Cameroun EITI Cameroon,” EITI, 2020, https://eiti.org/cameroon;
“Upholding the Standard internationally: Validation,” EITI, 2020, https://
bit.ly/32bizcp.
41 Ministry of Environment, Protection of Nature and Sustainable
Development (MINEPDED), Operational Guidelines for Obtaining Free,
Prior and Informed Consent in REDD+ Initiatives in Cameroon (2014),
https://bit.ly/305he41.
42 Tegegnea, Y. T. et al., above note 39, 6.
9
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Cameroon’s Legal Framework
A relatively complicated collection of laws, ordinances,
decrees, conventions, and other associated documents
govern the management of land and natural resources in
Cameroon. This section briefly summarizes aspects of key
legislative instruments in order to help inform any insights
and findings concerning land investment transparency.
Legal ownership of land: Individual community members
that do not have a certificate of ownership have no legal
entitlement to their customary lands. Unregistered community-held lands are deemed to be “National Land” (domaine national) and subject to the state’s guardianship.43
Individuals who have continuously resided on National
Land or used it for agriculture or animal grazing since July
6, 1974, can apply for land certificates in their names.44
Those demonstrating those same uses after that date can
only apply for a provisional concession (concession temporaire), which is a weaker right over the land that lacks
the permanence of land ownership.45 Yet registering either
type of right is prohibitively expensive and hard to navigate for poor people.46 And customarily held land that is
43 Ordonnance n° 74-1 du 6 juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier, Arts.
14, 16. Without adequate legal education for citizens, the Government
can exploit its role as guardian over National Land to claim that it is the
owner of the land. Such claims, while technically false, can appear to
citizens to be confirmed when the Government allocates concessions
to companies with little regard for the communities holding legitimate
tenure rights over such lands.
44 Ordonnance n° 74-1 du 6 juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier, Arts.
17(2), 15(1).
45 Ordonnance n° 74-1 du 6 juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier,
Arts. 17(1), 15(1) ; Focus on Land in Africa, Brief: Land Registration in
Cameroon, https://bit.ly/3jP8rwk.
46 RELUFA and CANADEL, Etude de base sur la transparence et la
participation des communes et communautes dans les processus
d’attribution et de gestion des concessions foncieres et minieres : Cas
des regions du centre, de l’est, du nord et du sud du Cameroun. (May,
2016), 37; Tchawa, P., above note 27, 44-45; Interview with Government
representative, Nov, 2019.
10

fallow or otherwise not developed cannot be registered.47
Of further concern, a community as a single entity lacks
legal personhood and thus cannot currently apply for title.48 Customary ownership, therefore, risks being extinguished if those individuals holding land since 1974 pass
away before it has been formally documented. Moreover,
the State can allocate commercial rights over National
Land (including unregistered community lands) to itself or
investors, according to a “loosely defined” public purpose
requirement.49
Use rights: Groups of community members can claim customary use rights to hunt and gather on National Land
that is otherwise free of any occupation.50 They can also
claim rights to harvest and exploit certain forest, wildlife,
and fisheries products for personal uses.51 These rights
do not expressly entitle community members to protect
forests, wildlife, and fisheries from external threats, or to
plant and harvest crops; only those who have continuously occupied, or conducted agriculture or animal grazing
on, National Land since July 6, 1974, as described in the
previous paragraph, will be legally entitled to register their
use rights over that land.

47 Wily, L. A., Whose land is it? The status of customary land tenure in
Cameroon, CED, FERN, and The Rainforest Foundation UK (Feb. 2011),
55, https://bit.ly/3jMWirI.
48 Wily, L. A., above note 47, 52, and 54.
49 Wily, L. A., above note 47, 56, 60, interpreting Ordonnance n° 74-1
du 6 juillet 1974, Art. 18, with Ordonnance n° 74-2 du 6 juillet 1974, Arts.
10 (5) and 12; RELUFA and CANADEL, above note 46, 38.
50 Ordonnance n° 74-1 du 6 juillet 1974 fixant le régime foncier, Arts.
17(3), 15(2).
51 Loi n° 94-01 de Jan 20, 1994, Art. 8(1).
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Commercial concessions: Investors seeking concessions
on National Land first obtain a provisional concession (up
to five years); long-term concessions are then granted if
the investor demonstrates compliance with the provisional concession.52 The President allocates concessions larger
than 50 hectares by decree.53 While there is no legal framework for the signing of investor-state contracts, these are
nonetheless also used to confer rights and obligations on
investors and the Government regarding the conduct of a
land-based investment—often before the granting of Presidential decree.54 Experts have noted that Cameroon’s concession allocation regime “was not designed to regulate
the kind of vast projects that are emerging.”55 Government
representatives also told us that the current approach for
awarding concessions was problematic, set processes in
the wrong order, side-lined local government, and caused
communities to resort to direct action.56
Consultation: Consultations for provisional concessions
include a Consultative Board, which includes five Government representatives and three representatives from each
community affected—namely, a chief and two notables (a
traditional position formalized within each community).57
The Consultative Board provides recommendations to
higher-level administrative bodies about how any implicated unregistered land should be managed, taking into
account local needs.58 Investors are not required to consult
with local communities at this stage, though some do.

52 Décret n° 76/166 du 27 avril 1976, fixant les modalités de gestion
du domaine national, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 9, 10.
53 Décret n° 76/166 du 27 avril 1976, above note 52, Art. 7. However,
see Nguiffo, S, and Watio, M, above note 25, 42 for a discussion of a
conflict between this decree and Circular No 000009/Y.18/MINDAF/D300
of Dec. 29, 2005.
54 For example, an Establishment Convention for an agribusiness
project was signed between the Government and SG Sustainable Oils
Cameroon PLC in 2009, yet the Presidential decrees authorizing the
project were not granted until 2013. SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC,
Establishment Convention, 2009; Decret n° 2013/416 du 25 novembre
2013; Decret n° 2013/417 du 25 novembre 2013; Decret n° 2013/418 du
25 novembre 2013. All documents located at: https://bit.ly/2BeIzs8.
55 Nguiffo, S., and Watio, M., above note 25, 56.
56 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019; Statement
from Government representative, Nov, 2019.
57 Décret n° 76-166 du 27 avril 1976 fixant les modalités de gestion du
Domaine National, Art. 12.
58 Nguiffo, S., and Watio, M., above note 25, 41

Impact assessments: Investors are required to carry out
environmental impact assessments (EIAs),59 and inform
“the populations concerned” 30 days before public consultations and hearings relating to an EIA.60 The EIA must
be realized “with the participation of concerned populations through consultants and a public audience, in order
to collect the populations’ opinions on the project.”61 Any
opposition and opinions on the EIA should be heard and
recorded.62 Once completed, EIAs must be made public
and posted in reading centers in the project area.63
Contract transparency: Cameroon’s Transparency Code
requires contracts that the Government signs with investors exploiting natural resources to be made public.64 Read
literally, the law requires the publication of investor-state
contracts for agribusiness projects, yet few of Cameroon’s
estimated 60 large-scale agribusiness concessions have
been published.65 Given the country’s demonstrated ability to extensively publish forestry contracts and associated documents, its failure to systematically publish all
past agribusiness contracts and decrees is in breach of the
Transparency Code.

59 Law No. 96/12 Relating to Environmental Management, (Aug. 5,
1996), Art. 17.
60 Décret n° 2005/0577/PM du 23 février 2005 sur les modalités de
réalisation des études d’impact environnemental, Art. 12(1).
61 Décret n° 2005/0577/PM du 23 février 2005 sur les modalités de
réalisation des études d’impact environnemental, Art. 11(1).
62 Décret n° 2005/0577/PM du 23 février 2005 sur les modalités de
réalisation des études d’impact environnemental, Art. 11(2).
63 Nguiffo, S., and Watio, M., above note 25, 21.
64 Law No 2019/11 of July 11, 2018: Code of Transparency and Good
Governance in Public Finance Management, Art. 6.
65 Nkuintchua, T. et al., “Here’s how Cameroon can achieve land
transparency,” Thompson Reuters Foundation News, (Aug. 20, 2018):
https://tmsnrt.rs/3fzWsjt.
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Community Experiences

Our visits to communities in or near agribusiness66 concessions consistently revealed community frustration
with being kept in the dark. Community members often
stressed that they were not opposed to investment. But
they were frustrated about not being adequately informed
or included in decision-making concerning their lands and
resources. Community members were generally under-informed about nearby investors’ rights and responsibilities.
They therefore struggled to secure investment-related
benefits and protections that may have been promised. A
lack of information and meaningful dialogue often led to
conflict, as lands community members had occupied and
managed for years were converted into industrial plantations on which they were no longer welcome. Community
members reported being chased off lands that had provided them with mangos and nuts for generations.67 Others desperate for meaningful dialogue with the company
resorted to blocking roads. And powerful actors, seeking
to protect what have been described as militarized plantations,68 used litigation and imprisonment against community members and sought to intimidate civil society actors.

66 We use the term “agribusiness concessions” to refer to both agroindustrial plantations, such as those of La Société Camerounaise des
Palmeraies (SOCAPALM) and Hévéa Cameroun SA (HEVECAM), and
smaller projects, such as that of la Société Agricole de l’Océan, whose
size is somewhere between 550 and 627 hectares.
67 Interview with community members, Nov, 2019. “They chase us
when we go over there to gather wild mangos and nuts. We are scared.”
68 “Note De Position des Femmes Riveraines des Agro-Industries sur
le Respect de leurs Droits Fonciers,” LandCam, (Mar 4, 2020), 2.
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Accessing information:
“We want the Memorandum of Understanding and
other documents to be made public.”69
Just as other researchers have found,70 the community
members we spoke to struggled to access information they
were entitled to. Of the six communities visited, only one
had obtained agreements and other documents relating
to a nearby concession—and these were acquired through
informal channels after the repeated refusal of authorities
and the investor. These barriers to accessing information
aligned with our own experiences. For instance, one company asserted a commitment to a “transparent approach,”
saying that it “remain[ed] at [our] disposal for any documentation,” but then never responded to our requests for
copies of its leases and accompanying documents.71
While one Government representative insisted that community members could access concession documents
through the country’s government gazette (journal officiel),72 this seemed naïve or ignorant of the real challenges
in accessing such documents. Specifically: several years
of the government gazette were reportedly never published; not all contracts and concessions are believed to
be included in it; and community members generally lack
funds, tools, and know-how needed to access it and find

69 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
70 CED, above note 8; Kenfack, P., The Legal and Institutional
Framework on Access to Information in the Granting and Management
of Land Concessions in Cameroon: A Diagnostic Study. (RELUFA, Apr.
2015), 11.
71 Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020; CCSI letters of Oct 19 and Oct. 26. 2020.
72 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
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what documents are included.73 Other documents amending the terms of such contracts, such as letters and formal
amendments, are even harder to track down and currently
even less likely to be included in the journal officiel.74
Community members also experience generational barriers to information access. In many cases, agreements negotiated between a chief and an investor were long lost,
and thus difficult for community members to locate years
or decades later. For the SOCAPALM (La Société Camerounaise des Palmeraies) and HEVECAM (Hevea Cameroun
SA) plantations, community members reported that their
ancestors, who may have witnessed the beginning of the
plantations (as State-owned enterprises in 1968 and 1975,
respectively,75 when Cameroon was still a single party
State), had since passed away. Many documents are long
lost, and community members present at that time were
likely reluctant to request information or to seek to influence the incoming plantations because, as one current
community member explains, “they were intimidated and
didn’t know how to do it.”76
Transparency after the fact:
“The white man said that he had already spoken with
the President about the project, and therefore all that
was needed was a 60-minute meeting with the community.” — Community member77
“We do not take the existence of communities into
account … Projects are decided on in Yaoundé before
even speaking to community members.” — Government representative78
Both Bantu and Bagyeli community members at various
plantation sites reported that concessions were allocated
by the central Government before any meaningful com73 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
74 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
75 Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al., “Assessment of the Effectiveness,
Efficiency and Equity of Benefit-Sharing Schemes under Large-Scale
Agriculture: Lessons from Land Fees in Cameroon,” European Journal of
Development Research 25, no. 4 (2013): 645. SOCAPALM was privatized
in 2000 and HEVECAM was privatized in 1996.
76 Interviews with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “SOCAPALM
installed itself in 1979. We don’t remember that time, and there is no
Bagyeli here who was around in 1979.” “No one knows when HEVECAM’s
plantation was created. Our parents who are now dead were the witness
of the plantation’s installation. No one ever sought to understand why
there was this exploitation because they were intimidated and didn’t
know how to do it.”
77 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
78 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.

munity engagement took place.79 Multiple Government
representatives confirmed this was the case.80 Having Government approval processes take place before community
consultation clearly falls foul of Cameroon’s obligations
and imperatives according to international and regional
human rights law jurisprudence and interpretations and
guidelines.81 It also led to Government representatives
sharing the frustration of community members. A representative from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) recounted that for one project, “[t]he
contract was established in Yaoundé; we didn’t know that
beforehand” before declaring that “we need a process that
is more participatory, to avoid local populations resorting
to marching [protesting], so that we can hear the population. We are not implicated in the project.”82
79 Interviews with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “There was
no EIA done before SAO [La Société Agricole de l’Océan] installed itself.
There were no consultations, no one took into account the Bagyeli
community”; “HEVECAM was created in 1975. There was no cahier des
charges. This absence led to all the other problems we have”; “There
are times where the company does not sign a cahier des charges or
share an EIA. They do whatever they want. Where are the EIAs? Where
are the cahiers des charges?”; “I am surprised to hear that the EIAs are
conducted before the project begins.”
80 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019; Statements
from Government representative, Nov, 2019. “After the contract is
signed, local people are accounted for”; “When the company met the
sous-préfet, with their contract already established, they explained
what the contract says about where they can work. A schedule for
meeting each village was then set.”
81 See, e.g., Endorois/ Center for Minority Rights and Development &
Others v Kenya, 276/03, (African Commission on Human Rights, Feb. 4,
2010), para. 291. “[For] any development or investment projects that
would have a major impact within the Endorois territory, the State
has a duty not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain
their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and
traditions;” UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, General recommendation No. 34 on the rights of rural women,
UN DOC. CEDAW/C/GC/34, paras. 54(e) and 62(d). “To ensure the
active, free, effective, meaningful, and informed participation of rural
women in political and public life, and at all levels of decision-making,
States parties should [… e]nsure that rural development projects are
implemented only after participatory gender and environmental impact
assessments have been conducted with the full participation of rural
women, and after obtaining their free, prior and informed consent.”
“States parties should [… o]btain the free and informed consent of
rural women before the approval of any acquisitions or project affecting
rural lands or territories and resources, including those relating to the
lease and sale of land, land expropriation and resettlement;” Voluntary
Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries
and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT), para. 9.9.
“States and other parties should hold good faith consultation with
indigenous peoples before initiating any project;” African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 224 Resolution on a Human Rights-Based
Approach to Natural Resources Governance, ACHPR/Res.224(LI) (2012).
Calling on States Parties to “[c]onfirm that all necessary measures must
be taken by the State to ensure participation, including the free, prior
and informed consent of communities, in decision making related to
natural resources governance.”
82 Statement from Government representative, Nov, 2019.
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Understanding information:
“A rather passive form of education was done, aimed
mainly at the transmission of information…”83
Community members recounted meetings with company
and Government representatives where information was
provided. But it was conveyed in ways that did not empower them to influence decisions about a project. And
such information was hard to retain. Some community
members wondered whether chiefs who had since passed
away might have once received documentation, even if
it was now nowhere to be found.84 Community meetings
tended to encourage the passive education of community
members, rather than helping them to defend their rights,
obtain meaningful benefits, and hold powerful actors to
their responsibilities.85 Language was also a barrier. One
member of a Bagyeli community expressed a desire for her
children to speak French so that they could raise their voices.86 In another case, a contract for an extractive industries
project in a Francophone area was reportedly only made
available in English.87
Using information:
“When problems arise, where do we go? The investor
is very strong and powerful.”88
Even where communities had access to information or
dialogue processes,89 they faced barriers to using information to further their objectives. A lack of transparency,
combined with immense power imbalances, neutralized
83 Endeley, J., and Sikud, F., The social impact of the Chad-Cameroon
oil pipeline: How industrial development affects gender relations, land
tenure, and local culture. (2007), 76. Referring to consultations attached
to the Chad-Cameroon Pipeline, which terminates at Kribi.
84 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
85 A similar dynamic was noted by Endeley, J. and Sikud, F., above
note 83.“A rather passive form of education was done, aimed mainly at
the transmission of information, instead of an active one that enables
communities to ensure and demand the protection of their rights,
whereby they get most of the benefits and minimise the effects of
project activities.”
86 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “[We want]
our children to also know how to read and speak French to be able to
defend the interests of the Bagyeli against the Bantus.”
87 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
88 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
89 Periodic bilateral or multilateral dialogues were reported at two
company sites. SOCAPALM told us that it has “established quarterly
trilateral dialogue platforms communities-State-Socapalm since 2016.
Furthermore two-party platforms Socapalm-communities are also
organized at less regular intervals”: Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
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the participatory potential of existing multi-stakeholder
dialogue platforms. One community participant in such
a platform noted that “the problems of nearby communities are not reflected in the platforms. We have some
information, but not the cahier des charges [an annex to
a convention that set out additional conditions, many of
which concern protections and social programs for affected communities] and not the information about the
money that the company earns.”90 Another noted that
“we can speak [at the platform] but not everything is up
for discussion.”91 The platforms also exhibited structural
and governance weaknesses. Local authorities controlled
which community representatives were appointed, which
limited the potential for authentic community concerns to
be aired and resolved if such concerns were at odds with
the interests of the Government.92 Meeting agendas were
also tightly controlled, with community members having
to visit far away municipal offices to access, or request additions to, the agenda before the meeting.93 One Government representative also stressed that discussions during
platforms are not adequately being transmitted to decision-makers.94 One of the companies confirmed it had established such dialogues which “seek to address possible
grievances and complaints, to exchange information between the company and the local residents and to present
corporate social responsibility projects.” While explaining
that the dialogues are held “in a language that is understood by all” and that “meeting minutes are available at
the administration and general management offices of the
plantation companies,”95 the company did not address the
challenges described in this paragraph.
Avenues for legal redress were also difficult to access and
are widely regarded as lacking independence. Cameroon’s
judiciary is widely regarded as “subordinate to the executive” and subject to widespread corruption.96 A lack of
90 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
91 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
92 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “The mode of
selecting village representatives causes problems … the representatives
are influenced by the local authorities. The administration adds all of its
weight and the discussions do not always reflect the realities of those
who live in the villages.”
93 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “The
authorities want the discussions to stay in the order of what was set
beforehand, and if we try to raise another issue, they stop us from doing
so. They demand that we respect the procedure. Before each meeting,
if a representative wants to introduce a topic of discussion, they have to
visit the préfet to inform them beforehand.”
94 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
95 Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
96 Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI), BTI 2020 Country
Report: Cameroon (2020), p. 12; US Department of State, Cameroon
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public information about the nature and status of ongoing
cases and outcomes also isolated wronged communities
and limited citizens’ ability to join and strengthen cases
or adopt similar legal strategies, further undermining access to justice.97 Community and civil society representatives saw administrative and judicial authorities as only
protecting company interests and not supportive of community efforts to pursue legal redress.98 Such perceptions
were seemingly validated when a judge of the High Court
Ndian Division, who ordered an injunction against Herakles Farms,99 was then reportedly transferred to a different
division (the company reportedly then violated the injunction).100 A United Nations expert has also called for human
rights defenders in Cameroon to be protected after noting
allegations that individuals seeking to apply to courts to
protect the land and human rights of local communities
are often pressured not to do so.101
A representative from HEVECAM took pains to note that
the company had a non-judicial grievance mechanism.
Yet, when we asked to see copies of the company’s documentation concerning this procedure, we were told they
were confidential.102 One Government interviewee even
recounted a personal experience, relating to the loss of
their community’s land, where a MINDCAF representative
seemed uninterested in responding to community complaints.103

2019 Human Rights Report, p. 10; GAN Business Anti-Corruption Portal,
Cameroon Corruption Report, https://bit.ly/2BYBcpl; Kamga, G. E. K.,
“The Political (In)Dependence of the Judiciary in Cameroon: Fact or
Fiction?” Africa Review 11, no. 1 (2019): 46-62.
97 Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
98 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “No Bagyeli
has ever brought a claim or complaint about this situation because the
Bagyeli is intimidated, he is afraid of the police and the gendarmerie”;
Interview with civil society representative, Apr, 2020.
99 SEFE vs SGSOC. Suit No. HCN/003/2011/1M/2011, (Mundemba
High Court, Aug. 31, 2011); CED and RELUFA, Above All Laws: How an
American Company Operates Illegally in Cameroon. (Feb. 2013), 9-10,
https://bit.ly/308bSVD.
100 Etahoben, B., “Fighting the Devils’ Land Grab Pact: Chronicle #9,”
Zam Magazine, (Sep 9, 2014), https://bit.ly/2Cyq8Pk; Edimo, A. M., Letter
from Andrew M. Edimo to then-Herakles Farms CEO Bruce Wrobel. Letter.
From Scission, Cameroon: One Front in the Struggle Against Global
Capital’s War on the Earth, Jun. 19, 2014. https://bit.ly/2CzYUb3.
101 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De
Schutter, Mission to Cameroon. (Dec. 18, 2012), UN Doc. A/HRC/22/50/
Add.2, paras. 23, 73(m).
102 Verbal communication with HEVECAM representative, Nov, 2019.
SOCAPALM provided us with its procedures for managing internal and
external complaints: Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
103 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.

Communities as data producers:
“We have asked BACUDA for help delimiting
our lands.”104
Communities want to generate land rights and land use
data themselves. For instance, rural women living alongside agro-industrial plantations in Cameroon have called
for participatory and community mapping of village
boundaries and sensitive or especially important areas
for communities.105 Community-led data generation can
address many transparency challenges, by empowering
community members to flag unauthorized activities and
adverse impacts and fact check inaccurate narratives. It
can lead to more informed decision-making and monitoring of company actions by governments and financiers.
Existing data sovereignty efforts led by communities and
civil society organizations in Cameroon include mapping
customary lands as a strategy to increase tenure security,106 and mapping cut logs to track illegal logging.107 Community complaints about environmental pollution could
also be bolstered by community-led monitoring, although
civil society organizations that previously attempted such
work found it prohibitively expensive.108
Encouragingly, public actors have acknowledged the
usefulness for Government and, by implication, some
degree of reliability, in community-generated information. Representatives from various Government agencies
participated alongside other stakeholders in the development of a standard methodology for community land-use
mapping.109 And in 2017, Cameroon’s National Institute of
Cartography (INC) agreed to digitally store, archive, and
distribute participatory maps of land holdings prepared
by community members.110 In addition, one Government
104 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
105 “Note de position des femmes riveraines des agro-industries sur
le respect de leurs droits fonciers,” above note 68, 4.
106 See, e.g., Nelson, J., An Overview of Community Mapping with FPP
in Cameroon. (Forest Peoples Program, Jul. 2007); The Tenure Facility,
Community mapping for effective land-use planning: development of a
common methodology for community mapping in Cameroon. (2017),
https://bit.ly/2Ons9Rb.
107 CED, Plateforme de Signalement d’une Observation en Direct,
http://signalement.bd-obster.org.
108 Statement from civil society representative, Nov, 2019.
109 The Tenure Facility, above note 106.
110 CED, “Cameroun: L’Institut National de Cartographie va
reconnaître les cartes participatives,” CED News, (Mar. 20, 2017): https://
bit.ly/3gUiUnS; Rainbow Environment Consult, Guide synthétique et
pratique de la méthodologie unifiée de cartographie participative au
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representative also confirmed that community-generated
information can be useful for the Government and a valid
data source for decision-making.111
Reactions, rather than rights:
“Everything happens in response to grievances, not
because of [communities’] rights.”112
The lack of functional processes for ongoing information
sharing and collaborative decision-making is linked to a
larger problem. Community members are treated more
as subjects than as rights holders. While international law
guarantees the rights to information and public participation for all people, and the right to give or withhold free,
prior and informed consent for Indigenous peoples and
other minorities,113 these rights were often not respected
in practice. (SOCAPALM referred us to its parent company’s
responsible management policy, which commits all subsidiaries to respect the right of all communities to give or
withhold their free, prior and informed consent.114) Government representatives themselves depicted a passive or reactive governance culture: one representative noted a lack
of Government monitoring, which enabled companies to
shirk benefit-sharing obligations;115 another conceded that
“after we grant a concession and time passes, we receive
no news about what is happening;”116 and a third told aggrieved community representatives that “if you have proof
… you will be listened to” and “it’s up to you to present us
with your grievances and needs.”117
This culture of reactive governance is exacerbated by the
lack of legal recognition of undocumented customary land
rights, which leaves community landholders in a legally
precarious position.118 Processes to obtain formal land titles in Cameroon have also been described by Transparency International Cameroon as “the most devastating
hotbed of corruption” and “a veritable obstacle course.”119
Cameroun. (2018), 17, https://bit.ly/3eq66UK.
111 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
112 Statement from community representative, Nov, 2019.
113 See, e.g., Szoke-Burke, S and Cordes, K. Y, “Mechanisms for
Consultation and Free, Prior and Informed Consent in the Negotiation
of Investment Contracts,” Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business Vol. 41 (forthcoming, 2020-21), 11-18, https://bit.ly/3fwhlfK.
114 SOCFIN, Politique de gestion responsable du Groupe Socfin (Mar.
2017), Arts. 2 (para 1), 3.2 (para 5), and 4 (para 2).
115 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
116 Interview with Government representative, Nov, 2019.
117 Statement from Government representative, Nov, 2019.
118 RELUFA and CANADEL, above note 46, 38.
119 Le Messager, “Selon Transparency International, le titre
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The Government has long resisted the formal recognition
of collective land rights,120 perhaps on the assumption that
communities without legal land tenure documentation
are easier to ignore when allocating lands to investors. But
this approach often leads to conflict.121 Thus, instead of
making it easier to allocate land to incoming investors, the
Government’s approach to land rights is self-sabotaging,
essentially increasing operational risks and costs for agribusiness companies and damaging Cameroon’s perceived
investment climate.122 (As mentioned above, the U.S. State
Department’s 2019 assessment of Cameroon’s agricultural
investment climate directly identified difficulties securing
tenure rights in Cameroon as a “significant obstacle.”123)
The failure to frame information and participation as the
human rights they are, and the inadequacy of current
transparency practices, is to every stakeholder’s detriment.
When decisions are made without important community
insights and participation, the risk of grievances and conflict increases; this has been shown to increase costs by up
to 29 times a normal scenario, and even to lead to project
failure.124 Indeed, such risks have reportedly borne out at
the sites visited for this research. Communities recounted
the barring of roads at two of the three projects we visited—barred by community members frustrated by a lack
of available information, at feeling excluded from decision-making, and at company representatives’ apparent
unwillingness to hear and respond to their grievances.125
In addition to bearing the negative impacts of projects
designed without their knowledge, community members then had to do the risky and time-consuming work
of obtaining information through informal channels and
following up with authorities and investors for meaningful
dialogue.126
foncier est un foyer de corruption le plus dévastateur au Cameroun,”
farmlandgrab.org, (Sep. 17, 2018): https://bit.ly/2MZJ0sK
120 Tchawa, P., above note 27, 44.
121 Assembe-Mvondo, S., et al., above note 75, 651, referring to
Gerber, J.-F., “Conflicts over industrial tree plantations in the South:
Who, how and why?” Global Environmental Change 21, (2011), 165–176.
See also CED’s Atlas of anger and resistance (ACORECA), which maps
conflicts emerging between agro-industry and local communities:
http://www.cedcameroun.org/cartotheque/.
122 Arounsavath, F., above note 31, 14.
123 US Department of State, above note 35.
124 See, e.g., The Munden Project, The Financial Risks of Insecure Land
Tenure: An Investment View. (Dec. 2012), 2-3, https://bit.ly/3gVCNuD.
125 Interviews with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “There
was no information, no consultation. SOCAPALM did not involve the
nearby communities, so the communities blocked the road, demanding
a negotiation”; “We blocked the road to stop the journey of HEVECAM’S
managers. We made the director of HEVECAM stop to listen to our
demands.”
126 Interview with community representative, Nov, 2019.
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Finally, a lack of recognition for legitimate customary tenure rights means that legally required land rents over National Land are paid by companies to Government. This
can introduce transparency and accountability challenges
over revenue received and undermine communities’ ability to hold public authorities to their obligation to distribute 20% of rents received to relevant village communities
or collectivities.127
Indigenous communities kept in the dark:
“We were not taken into account as members
of the community during the benefit sharing
negotiations.”128
African and international institutions have helped to clarify that the phrase “all Africans are Indigenous” is a misconception.129 While almost all African societies were subjected
to colonial rule, “Indigeneity” as used in international law
refers to peoples whose culture and way of life differ from
those of mainstream society, are dependent on access to
traditional lands and resources, and would be threatened
in the event of dispossession of those lands and resources.130 Such peoples may have their own language131 and
can claim protection under international law even if the
government refuses to recognize their Indigeneity, provided they, themselves, identify as Indigenous.132 In Cameroon, Indigenous groups include non-Bantu ethnic groups,
such as the Bagyeli, Baka and Bedzan hunter-gatherers,
the Mbororo pastoralists, and the Kirdi mountain communities. International law recognizes specific rights for Indigenous peoples, which help to combat and delegitimize the
particular forms of discrimination. As noted by the African
127 Décret n° 76-166 du 27 avril 1976 fixant les modalités de gestion
du Domaine National, Art. 17; Assembe-Mvondo, S, et al., above note
75, 641-643.
128 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019.
129 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and
International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Indigenous
Peoples in Africa: The Forgotten Peoples? The African Commission’s work
on indigenous peoples in Africa (2006), 12, https://bit.ly/305LJHb.
130 UNDRIP, Art. 34; Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya)
and Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare
Council v. Kenya, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
Communication No. 276/2003 (Feb. 4, 2010), paras. 150, 156, 235, 244,
251.
131 G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), (Oct. 2, 2007), Arts. 13, 14, 16. While not
binding in and of itself, UNDRIP is regarded as synthesizing various
(binding) customary international law principles.
132 International Labour Organization, Convention (No. 169)
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,
opened for signature June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383 (entered into force
Sept. 5, 1991), Art. 1(2).

Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, such communities use the term “Indigenous” not to “deny all other Africans their legitimate claim to belong to Africa” but
instead to “analyse the particularities of their sufferings
and by which they can seek protection in international human rights law and moral standards.”133 The Government,
through at least four different ministries, has repeatedly
reaffirmed this concept of Indigeneity in its Indigenous
People Development Plans for Baka, Kola/Bakola/Bagyeli,
Aka, and Bezdang groups for many World Bank-financed
projects.134
The Government is bound by international law to protect
the rights of its Indigenous peoples to self-determination135
and to respect their decisions to give or withhold their free,
prior and informed consent, among others.136 These rights
have important transparency implications, including that
Indigenous peoples have the right to all relevant pertinent
information about actual or proposed projects using their
lands or resources, to be meaningfully included in decision-making concerning such investments, and to give or
withhold their consent to a proposed or actual project. In133 ACHPR and IWGIA, above note 129, 12.
134 Ministry of Economy, Planning and Regional Development
(MINEPAT), Indigenous People (“pygmy”) Development Plan for the
Participatory Community Development Programme (PNDP) (Jun. 2003),
3, https://bit.ly/2Zr3scW; MINEFOF, Indigenous People (“pygmy”)
Development Plan for the Forest and Environment Sectoral Programme
(PSFE) Doc. No. IPP86 (Undated), 2, https://bit.ly/32lTmMa; Republic
of Cameroon, Indigenous People (“Pygmy”) Development Plan for
Sustainable Agro-Pastoral and Land Management Promotion Under the
Community Development Program Support Project in Support of the First
Phase of the Community Development Program (Aug. 24, 2005), 3, https://
bit.ly/2CyximG; MINEE, Projet d’electrification rurale et d’acces a l’energie
dans les zones sous desservies au cameroun (PERACE): Elaboration d’un
cadre de planification en faveur des populations autochtones (Juin 2018),
7, https://bit.ly/3eyvHuN; MINEFOP, Projet d’appui au developpement
des competences pour la croissance et l’emploi au cameroun (PADECE):
Cadre de planification des peuples autochtones du projet (CPPA)
(Novembre 2018), 4, https://bit.ly/2ZsWc0l.
135 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976), Arts. 1, 27; International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3, Art. 1. The right of Indigenous peoples to self-determination
is also set out in the UNDRIP, Art. 3.
136 Indigenous rights to give or withhold free, prior and informed
consent have been derived from or linked to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, Art. 14 (right to property) and ICCPR, Art.
27 (minority right to enjoy culture). See, e.g., Centre for Minority Rights
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on behalf
of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, 276/03, (African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Feb. 4, 2010), paras. 226, 29, and
Poma Poma v. Peru, Communication No. 1457/2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/95/D/1457/2006, (Human Rights Committee, Mar. 27, 2009), paras.
7.6, 7.7, respectively.
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ternational law also requires governments to consult with
Indigenous and tribal peoples for the development of laws
and administrative measures that affect them.137
Members of Bagyeli communities interviewed lacked important information about nearby investments and expressed frustration at not being included in key dialogues
between other communities and investors.138 As a result,
they did not feel empowered to raise grievances about
issues such as environmental pollution or extensive conversion, and hence loss, of the forests they have historically depended on.139 Their Bantu neighbors seemed better positioned to obtain investment-related benefits, like
employment and money payments.140 This transparency
failure is rooted in deep-seated societal inequalities and
racism,141 traceable back to the colonial marginalization of
Indigenous peoples.142 But it is also evidence of a failure by
public authorities and company representatives to adapt
community engagement strategies and investment approval processes to the needs of all community members,
including Indigenous communities.
137 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, C169. International
Labour Organization (June 27, 1989), Art. 6(1)(a); UN General Assembly.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN
Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007), Art. 19.
138 Interviews with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “We need
to be invited to meetings with the Bantus to have information and
so that we are able to speak on the name of our community”; “The
Bantus refuse to let Bagyelis participate in discussions [around land
ownership].”
139 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “No
Bagyeli has ever brought a claim or complaint about this situation
because the Bagyeli is intimidated, he is afraid of the police and the
gendarmerie […] We need your help to have a voice to complain, to
defend our spaces”; “Since SOCAPALM arrived, our river has become
polluted and we get sick if we drink from it. Our forests are our life…
[Now] to go hunting we have to go 5 or 6 kilometres out of the village.”
Having reviewed an earlier draft of this report, SOCAPALM disputed the
latter statement and said that “Biannual analyses are also conducted
to prevent any river pollution, contrary to what was stated.” SOCAPALM
also provided information about its parent company’s responsible
management management policy of 2017 and the various steps it has
taken to obtain RSPO certification, conduct High Conservation Value
(HCV) studies, and obtain ISO 14001 certification for its environmental
management system: Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
140 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “Bagyelis
never shared in the funds shared as part of the exploitation of the village
lands. We were not taken into account as members of the community
during the benefit sharing negotiations.”
141 Ngono, R., “The disappearance of indigenous languages in
Cameroon, what if the problem was linked to land?” LandCam, (Feb. 21,
2020): https://bit.ly/2DIdeiF.
142 CED, Réseau Recherches Actions Concertées Pygmées (RACOPY)
and Forest Peoples Programme (FPP), The situation of indigenous
peoples in Cameroon: A supplementary report submitted in connection
with Cameroon’s 15th-19th periodic reports. (Jan. 27, 2010), https://bit.
ly/2OlMKWf.
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Transparency and benefit sharing:
“[We want] the application of everything that has
been said and promised.”143
Community members repeatedly spoke of broken company promises—regarding improvements to local schools,
agricultural inputs for local producers, and payments to
the community.144 Nonetheless, community members expressed a desire to work together with companies.145 Information sharing and comprehension have an important
role to play in this regard. Understanding company obligations to deliver benefits, and information about company
earnings and payments made, can empower communities
to hold companies to their obligations and receive what
they are owed.146 Yet, information and documentation
were so often unavailable to community members that
they struggled to learn what job opportunities or other
benefits the company was supposed to deliver. Many community members were therefore unable to make the best
of terms the company was already bound by, compounding the negative impacts of their dispossession of land and
resources. Transparency of company obligations regarding
benefit sharing could help clarify roles and expectations.
In particular, such transparency would help companies to
demonstrate that any failures by the Government to fulfill basic public duties and services should not mean that
companies should be seen as the only avenue for obtaining social services or the resolution of grievances.
Other researchers have observed a lack of transparency
regarding mandatory company land rent payments to the
Government and communities.147 In the case of SOCAPALM,
for example, researchers have found that local elected of143 Statement from community representative, Nov, 2019.
144 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “The
company told us that it would give us a multimedia room for the local
school. Nothing was done”; “SAO promised to give cocoa plants to
villagers to encourage the youth to cultivate them, but it did not respect
[this promise]”; “SAO started by paying money to the community but it
stopped the payments. It has made payments for 3 years.”
145 Interview with community representatives, Nov, 2019. “We want
relations to work out with HEVECAM.”
146 CED, above note 70, 12; Interview with civil society representative,
Nov, 2019; RELUFA, Rapport Du Dialogue Intersectoriel Sur Les
Redevances (Royalties) Liées A l’Exploitation Des Ressources Naturelles
(Dec. 6, 2019), 4.
147 Décret n° 76-166 du 27 avril 1976 fixant les modalités de gestion du
Domaine National, Art. 17. “The income received from the allocation of
national lands, whether held by grant or on lease, shall be apportioned
40% to the State, 40% to the council in whose area the land is situated,
and 20% per cent for use in the public interest to the village community
concerned.”
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ficials were not even aware of the company’s obligation
to pay land rents and that local councils never received
any rent.148 According to that research, royalties were paid
to the General Directorate of Taxation, potentially alongside other payments, but nothing was transferred to local
stakeholders.149 That lack of transparency disempowered
local stakeholders from demanding their due, while reportedly also enabling “collusion between agro-industrial
operators and some government officials.”150 SOCAPALM
described this research as “incorrect,” stating that the
company “is regularly questioned about this issue during
the trilateral platforms” and that “we reply in full transparency.” The company also wrote that it has “already integrated this distribution in the new version of the long-term
lease, which will be revised at the completion of the land
tenure work” and that “this responsibility lies mainly with
the State and the management of its property-related revenues.”151

148
149
150
151

Methodology
This report forms part of a broader portfolio of research
conducted by CCSI and partners on a demand-driven approach to the transparency of land investments, focusing
on the transparency needs of project-affected communities and host governments. Data was primarily collected
in November 2019, through semi-structured group and individual interviews with six community groups located at
or near three different agricultural plantation sites in the
departement de l’Océan, and semi-structured interviews
with representatives of the Government and civil society
in Yaoundé. The authors also conducted desktop research
and gathered further data at two multi-stakeholder workshops, one in Kribi and the other in Yaoundé, attended by
representatives of affected Bagyeli and Bantu communities, Government, civil society organizations, agribusiness,
and the media. Additional contextual interviews were
conducted virtually with representatives of national and
international civil society and academia. Multiple versions
of this report were peer reviewed by land and natural resource governance practitioners residing in or familiar with
Cameroon. MINDCAF, MINADER, the Ministry of Economy,
Planning and Regional Development (MINEPAT), the Ministry of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable
Development (MINEPDED), the Prime Minister’s office, and
the operators of the three agribusiness sites visited were
provided with an earlier draft of the report and an invitation to respond and share their perspectives. Two companies and one Ministry provided written responses.

Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al., above note 75, 646.
Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al., above note 75, 649-50.
Assembe-Mvondo, S. et al., above note 75, 651.
Letter to CCSI, Oct. 16, 2020.
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